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THE CENTRAL MEANING OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY,
MAJORITY RULE, AND THE DENOMINATOR
PROBLEM
AKHIL REED AMAR*
Like the apostle Paul, Republican Government has been "made
all things to all men."1 The concept is indeed a spacious one, and
many particular ideas can comfortably nestle under its big tent.
Surprisingly, however, few modern scholars seem even aware of the
central meaning of Republican Government--of the main pole that
keeps the big top up, as it were. Today, I shall describe this central
pillar as understood and acted upon in the Founding, Antebellum,
and Civil War eras.
The central pillar of Republican Government, I claim, is popular
sovereignty. In a Republican Government, the people rule. They do
not necessarily rule directly, day-to-day. Republican Government
probably does not (as some have claimed) prohibit all forms of direct
democracy, such as initiative and referendum,2 but neither does it
require ordinary lawmaking via these direct populist mechanisms.
What it does require is that the structure of day-to-day govern-
ment--the Constitution--be derived from "the People" and be legally
alterable by a "majority" of them. These corollanes of popular sover-
eignty--the people's right to alter or abolish, and popular majority
rule in making and changing constitutions--were bedrock principles
in the Founding, Antebellum, and Civil War eras.3 And I shall show
that these principles were understood and accepted as the central
* Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. This symposium essay builds on my
Southmayd Inaugural Lecture. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed:
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994). For more
documentation and elaboration of my claims today, I urge the interested reader to con-
sult that Lecture. For help on this symposium essay, I thank Bruce Ackerman, Vik
Amar, Neal Katyal, and William Wiecek.
1. 1 Corinthians 9:22 (King James). In more modem translations, "all men" be-
comes "all [personsl." See, e.g., id. (Revised English). As we shall see, a similar trend
towards gender inclusivity marks the evolution of the definition of "the People" underly-
ing Republican Government.
2. See infra Part I.E.
3. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
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meaning of Republican Government by many of the major partici-
pants in constitutional debates from 1780 to 1870.4
Of course, participants in these constitutional debates disagreed
about a good deal--fiercely enough, at times, to. wage civil warss. --but
these disagreements only prove my point, for different sides argued
within the central meaning, not against it. And without more, the
central meaning of Republican Government left some big issues un-
resolved and up for grabs. Exactly who were "the People," a
"majority" of whom could lawfully alter or abolish constitutions? I
shall call this deep and recurring question "the denominator prob-
lem."
The denominator problem arose in many contexts, along many
axes. Were adult women part of the Republican People--the polity?
What about unpropertied adult males? How about free b~ack men?
Should "the People" be understood as the people of each state, or of
the United States as a whole? And what did the "majority rule" con-
cept require if a group constituting a "majority" of those who did
vote, but only a minority of those eligible to vote, authorized a new
constitution? Now these issues, I shall argue, are exactly the ones
that organized American constitutional discourse about, and imple-
mentation of, Republican Government between 1780 and 1870.
At the Founding, the very act of constitution itself--of ordainment
and establishment--embodied the first principles of Republican Gov-
ernment: the right of the sovereign people, via a special convention,
to alter their existing constitution by simple majority vote. The prob-
lem of the denominator generated explicit theoretical discussion, and
the very act of ratification further clarified some of the Founding
era's denominator problems. Because each state was sovereign and
independent prior to ratification, popular sovereignty took place
within each state, per Article VII of the new Constitution. The rule
of decision followed by each state was simple majority rule within a
specially called ratifying convention of "the People." Even in states
4. Ninety years is, of course, a long time, and a great deal relevant to the meaning
of Republican Government happened between 1780 and 1870. In keeping with the spirit
of a symposium, I shall aim at presenting representative rather than exhaustive docu-
mentation. Much of what I shall summarize today builds on earlier work of mine. See,
e.g., Amar, supra note 3.
5. Yes, wars. Like the American Civil War of the 1860's, the Rhode Island Civil
War of the 1840's and the Kansas Civil War of the 1850's crystallized around constitu-
tional debates within the central meaning of Republican Government. See infra parts
III.A.-B,
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where they could not vote for ordinary legislatures, unpropertied mi-
litiamen who had fought for their freedom in the Revolution were, it
seems, part of "the People" eligible to participate in constitutional
change by electing delegates to the specially called ratifying conven-
tions.6
In the Antebellum era, the central meaning of Republican Gov-
ernment was alive and well, with new state constitutions in many
states born via majority rule popular sovereignty. But in the early
1840's the denominator problem triggered a brief intrastate civil war
in Rhode Island. Pointing to two different state constitutions, two
different groups each claimed to be the lawful government of Rhode
Island. Backers of each constitution claimed that it, and not the
other, enjoyed the support of the relevant popular majority; but
which majority was entitled to rule? This was the key issue underly-
ing "Dorr's Rebellion" and generating the first major Supreme Court
case to address the Republican Government Clause, Luther v. Bor-
den.7 In the 1850's, the denominator problem resurfaced with a
vengeance in the western territories. Who, precisely, were "the Peo-
ple" entitled to exercise "popular sovereignty" in Kansas? Should
votes of "border ruffians"--Missouri residents who had no intention of
living in Kansas--count? If one side boycotted an election called by
the other, could a simple majority of those actually voting suffice to
bind the rest? These were the issues over which Kansas bled.8
The civil wars in Rhode Island and Kansas were, in retrospect,
mere preludes. In 1860 and 1861, various southern states called spe-
cial conventions in which simple majorities claimed the right to alter
their governments by seceding from the Union. President Lincoln, of
course, denied the legality of these attempted secessions. He agreed
that majority rule popular sovereignty was a central pillar of Repub-
lican Government, but argued that, under the U.S. Constitution, ul-
timate popular sovereignty resided in the collective people of the
United States, not the people of each state. Secessionist majoritari-
ans insisted that the lawful denominator was the state, not the Un-
6. The brief account of the Founding era offered in this paragraph is elaborated in
Part II, infra.
7. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
8. The brief account of the Antebellum era offered in this paragraph is elaborated
in Part III, infra.
HeinOnline -- 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 752 1993-1994
752 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
ion--"and the war came."9 When it ended, Sou.thern state govern-
ments needed to be re-constituted for re-entry into the Union, and
the denominator problem arose yet again. Were southern black
men--now freed by the Emancipation Proclamation--part of the state
peoples, and thus eligible to participate in the new state constitution-
making process? If Southern states that refused to include blacks
were to be excluded from Congress as "un-Republican," what about
Northern states that denied blacks the suffrage? The most momen-
tous issues of the Reconstruction era explicitly pivoted on the Repub-
lican Government Clause; and once again, debate and action swirled
within what I am calling its central meaning. 10
In Parts II, III and IV of what follows, I shall sketch how the cen-
tral meaning of Republican Government organized constitutional
words and deeds in the Founding, Antebellum, and Civil War eras
respectively. Before turning to those sketches, I shall in Part I can-
vass other possible approaches to the central meaning of Republican
Government.
I. SIDE SHOWS
The concept of Republican Government has spawned a consider-
able number of modern interpretations. Indeed, several of these in-
terpretations are the explicit foundations of, or targets of attack
from, the other main essays in today's symposium. Let us briefly
catalogue these contending theories before we consider what I claim
to be the concept's central meaning.
A. Indeterminacy
The Indeterminacy Thesis might deny that any such central
meaning exists. The concept of Republican Government, Indetermi-
nists would argue, is utterly vacuous. In 1807, John Adams com-
plained to Mercy Otis Warren that he had "never understood" what a
republic was and "no other man ever did or ever will."l1 But as the
9. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, in GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 415, 416 (Richard Hofstadter ed., 1958) [hereinafter
GREAT ISSUES].
10. The brief account of the Civil War era olTered in this paragraph is elaborated
in Part IV, infra.
11. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
48 (1969).
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great historian Gordon Wood has observed, Adams' "memory was
playing him badly" representing "the bewilderment of a man whom
ideas had passed by."12 As we shall see, Republican Government
had a rather precise signification to those who participated in the
framing and ratification of the Constitution in the late 1780's. Ad-
ams, alas, was off in Europe when these momentous words and deeds
unfolded; and in this very real way, the intellectual and practical
culmination of the American Revolution did indeed pass him by.
B. Nonjusticiability
Consider next the Nonjusticiability Thesis.13 According to this
view, the key thing to understand about the Republican Government
Clause of Article IV is that it is not ordinarily justiciable in Article
III courts. But why not? Because it is wholly devoid of analytic con-
tent, and cannot be made more specific through judicially manage-
able standards? This is simply the Indeterminacy Thesis in different
garb, and is no more persuasive in its new clothing. Indeed, it is
hard to see how other big clauses--from Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment, for example--are so different from the Republi-
can Government Clause in their potential breadth, and their need for
judicial mediating principles.
If instead, the Nonjusticiability Thesis is justified by appeal to
precedent, the thesis runs into other problems. As we shall see, the
hoary case said to establish the general nonjusticiability of the
Clause, Luther v. Borden,14 in fact establishes no such thing; and
the events giving rise to Luther show that the concept of Republican
Government does have a central meaning, intimately connected with
popular sovereignty and majority rule.15 And if we look at more
modern case law, we see that this vision is indeed justiciable--though
the Court in the landmark case of Reynolds v. Sims16 repackaged
these Republican Government issues as "equal protection" issues.
12. [d.
13. For more discussion of nonjusticiability, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under
the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1994) (this issue).
14. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1(1849).
15. See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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The majoritarian rhetoric of Reynolds17 harmonizes nicely with
the spirit of Republican Government, but much less well with the
text and history of the Equal Protection Clause itself, which was
written to protect the civil rights of minorities and nonvoting
"persons"--aliens, for example--rather than the political (voting)
rights of majorities. 18 The Nonjusticiability Thesis cannot explain
why this mismatching of clauses came to pass in U.S. Reports; the
account I shall offer, by contrast, does help to explain this anomaly.
C. State Autonomy
Next, consider the State Autonomy Thesis.19 On this view, a
core meaning of the Article IV Republican Government Clause is
that the federal government is limited in its ability to restructure
state government at will. The Clause guarantees a measure of state
governmental autonomy from the federal government. Congress
could not, for example, demand that Colorado locate its state capital
in Boulder rather than Denver, or switch to a unicameral legislature,
even if these changes might improve interstate commerce. There is
much that is right--textually, historically, and structurally--about
this thesis, but without more it is incomplete. At most, it is an ac-
count of a particular clause in Article IV, not a global account of Re-
publican Government generally, a concept that of course applies in
many other contexts--in federal territories that have not yet become
states, and in thinking about the Republican character of the federal
Constitution itself, for example.
Even as an account of Article IV, the State Autonomy Thesis is
only one side of the coin, as its most sophisticated proponent, Debo-
rah Jones Merritt, has explicitly noted.2o Sometimes, the federal
government may (or perhaps must) intervene and restructure state
government under the invitation (or mandate) of the Article IV Re-
17. See id. at 565 ("in a society ostensibly grounded on representative govem-
ment, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a
ml\iority of that State's legislators"). I do not here claim that this majoritarian rhetoric
was Reynold's sole, or even dominant, theme.
18. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193, 1224-26, 1234, 1261-62 & n.295 (1992).
19. For more discussion of state autonomy, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Republi-
can Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 815 (1994) (this issue).
20. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Fed-
eralism For a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1,25-26 (1988).
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publican Government Clause itself. For if the de facto government of
a state is not, indeed, "Republican" in form, the Clause calls for fed-
eral governmental intervention, not state governmental autonomy.
.But to decide when this intervention is called for, we need a richer
account of Republican Government itself, and its central meaning.
D. The Bill ofRights
Now let us turn to the Bill of Rights Thesis. On this account, any
state that violates any of its citizens' fundamental rights is not a
"Republican" state; and the federal Bill of Rights constitutes a pre-
sumptive, if nonexclusive, catalogue of these fundamental rights.
This thesis was prominently voiced in the 39th Congress in 1866 by
Senator James Nye and Representative Roswell Hart,21 and has
been discussed in some modern scholarship.22 If taken seriously, the
Thesis requires' repudiating the Supreme Court's 1833 landmark
case Barron v. Baltimore,23 which held that the original Bill of
Rights regulates only federal officials. Overruling Barron indeed
was the intent of the 39th Congress, and as I have argued else-
where,24 Congress embedded that intent in the plain meaning of the
words of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. As an account
of the meaning of the federal Constitution prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, the NyelHart Bill' of Rights Thesis is highly
problematic.
Certain rights and freedoms proclaimed in the Bill of Rights
might indeed be unabridgeable by any state that was truly
"Republican." Without broad protection for antigovernmental dis-
course, petitions, and assemblies, for example, popular sovereignty
and the right of the people to alter or abolish their existing govern-
ment might be meaningless.25 But not all provisions of the original
21. See Amar, supra note 18, at 1242.
22. See, e.g., Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause ofArticle N, Section 4: A
Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513,568-69 (1962).
23. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). .
24. Amar, supra note 18, at 1218-46.
25. This is the deep constitutional insight that James Madison explicated well in
the eighteenth century, that the Abolitionists and Reconstruction Republicans nour-
ished in the nineteenth century, and that the U.S. Supreme Court belatedly embraced
in the twentieth century, to the delight of the great constitutional theorist Alexander
Meiklejohn. On Madison, see id. at 1266-67 & n.314; on the Abolitionists and Recon-
struction Republicans, see id. at 1214-17, 1272-84; on the modern Court and Meiklejohn,
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Bill of Rights clearly connect to the central meaning of Republican
Government. A state that obliged criminal defendants to take the
witness stand--just as civil defendants and witnesses generally are
often obliged to testify against their wishes--might be called unfair,
or even illiberal; but it would hardly be un-Republican.
E. Anti-Direct Democracy
Consider next the Anti-Direct Democracy Thesis--the widely held
view that various forms of direct democracy such as initiatives and
referenda are inconsistent with Republican Government, and forbid-
den by the Republican Government Clause of .Article IV.26 The
foundation of this claim is remarkably slender, consisting of "law of-
fice history" based on a brief passage in Madison's Federalist Num-
ber 10 and a cross reference back to this passage in his Number 14,
which served as a sequel.27 Though Number 10 is now canonical, its
role at the Founding and for the next century was far more modest.
In a most careful study, the brilliant historian Douglass Adair noted
that:
see Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: RAV. v. City of St. Paul,
106 HARv. L. REV. 124, 125 n.13, 141 (1992).
26. For more discussion of Direct Democracy, see Hans A. Linde, Who Is Respon-
sible for Republican Government?, 65 U.COLO. L. REV. 709 (1994) (this issue). See also
Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is not "Republican Government": The Cam-
paign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993) [hereinafter Linde, Initiative].
Judge Linde ultimately suggests that only certain forms of direct democracy offend
Republican Government--for him, initiatives are more problematic than referenda, con-
stitutional initiatives more problematic than statutory initiatives, affirmative-
lawmaking initiatives more problematic than structural initiatives, and emotional,
ideological initiatives more problematic than other initiatives. Though his proposal
seems modest and attractive, it is rooted in a broader, Anti-Direct Democracy Thesis
whose historical foundations I mean to question here.
27. Cf. Linde, Initiative, supra note 26, at 22 ("We need not go to great lengths to
establish that the framers distinguished a republican form of government from direct
democratic lawmaking."). With all due respeCt to Judge Linde, he and others do need to
go to greater lengths than they have gone so far, at least to persuade me. Let me be
clear. I do not challenge the advantages of representative government for most pur-
poses; indeed, I have elsewhere extolled its virtues. See Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choos-
ing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1303-05 (1984). I mean only to
question whether the framers clearly understood that the Article IV Republican Gov-
ernment Clause would require representative government for all purposes; and I also
want to highlight the role that the people themselves--in conventions, and at times even
more directly--have played in making and amending American constitutions.
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" It was not until 1913, 125 years [after its initial publica-
tion], that Charles A. Beard made this particular essay
[Number 10] famous for students of the United States Consti-
tution. Before [1913], practically no commentator on The Fed-
eralist or the Constitiition, none of the biographers of Madison,
had emphasized Federalist 10 as of special importance for un-
derstanding our "more perfect union"....28
When we examine the key scrap of language from Federalist
Number 10, further doubts' crowd the mind:
A republic, by which I mean a governmEmt in which the
scheme of representation takes place, opens a different pros-
pect and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us.
examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy....
[A] great point[) of difference between' a democracy and .a
republic [is] the delegation of the government in the latter, to a
small number of citizens elected by the rest.29
Note that Madison here does not purport to be discussing
"Republican Government" within the meaning of the Republican
Government Clause of Article IV. And when he and Hamilton do
discuss this clause in Numbers 21 and 43, they nowhere refer back to
this scrap from Number 10. Note also that Madison seems a bit self-
conscious, aware that he is using the word "republic" in a nonobvi-
ous--perhaps even idiosyncratic--way: "A republic, by which I
mean " as opposed to "A republic, by which is generally
meant "
By contrast, only three paragraphs before the key scrap, Madison
refers nonchalantly and unselfconsciously to majority rule as "the
republican principle."30 And as we shall see, this linkage between
Republicanism and majority rule runs throughout The Federalist
Papers, and Founding era discourse more generally. Proponents of
the Anti-Democracy Thesis have yet to identify a similar pattern
linking Republicanism with a rejection of all forms of direct democ-
racy, and what little evidence there is seems to cut the other way.
To be sure, Madison does clearly refer back to Number 10 in his .Be-
28. DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 75-76 (1974).
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81-82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
30. Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
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quel, Number 14, where Madison repeats his claim that republics
rely on representation in contrast to democracies.31 But other
leading Framers seemed explicitly to say that Republican Govern-
ment could be either·directly or indirectly democratic.
In the South Carolina ratifying convention, Charles Pinckney
described a Republican Government as one where "the people at
large, either collectively or by representation, form the legislature."32
And in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention; the great James Wil~
son pointedly equated a "republic" with a "democracy"; in both (and
in explicit contrast to "monarchy" and "aristocracy") "the people at
large retain the supreme power, and act either collectively or by rep-
resentation."33 As Wilson put the point later in the convention, un-
der the Constitution "all authority, of every kind, is derived by repre-
sentation from the people, and the democratic principle is carried
into every part of the government."34 In debates over the Constitu-
tion, republican government was regularly contradistinguished from
monarchy and aristocracy, but rarely from democracy.35 Indeed,
Madison himself, who in Number 10 offered what he labeled a
"republican remedy for the disease most incident to republican gov-
ernment" had earlier described this very same scheine at Philadel-
phia as "the only defence agst. the inconveniences of democracy con-
sistent with the democratic form of Govt."36 Let us also note that in
the 1790's, various political groups sprang up, some labeling them-
selves "Republican Societies," some "Democratic Societies" and some
"Democra~ic~Republi~anSocieties"37 --and the political party Madison
co-founded in that decade began as the "Republican" party but later
became known as the "Democratic" party.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 100 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
32. 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (Jonathon
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881) [hereinafter ELLIOT's DEBATES] (emphasis added).
33. 2 id. at 433 (emphasis altered).
34. [d. at 482 (emphasis altered); see also id. at 478.
35. See, e.g., Merritt, supra note 20, at 25 & n.135; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 17, 62, 67, 73 (1972). But see id. at 18.
See also Robert W. Shoemaker, "Democracy" and "Republic" as Understood in Late
Eighteenth.Century America, 41 AM. SPEECHES 83 (1966). Though I do not concur in all
of his analysis I found Shoemaker's pulling together of primary sources most helpful.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIONS OF 1787, at 135 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937) (emphasis added) [hereinafter RECORDS].
37. Shoemaker, supra note 35, at 83.
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Until its proponents offer more evidence than scraps from Num-
ber 10 and its sequel Number 14,38 we are entitled to say, with the
Scotch, that the Anti-Direct Democracy reading of the Republican
Government Clause of Article IV is "not proven."
F. Common Good
Consider finally the Common Good Thesis that the essence of a
Republican Government is that virtuous citizens be willing to make
sacrifices for the greater common good.39 On this view, a Republic's
spirit and aim was the res publica, the public affairs, or the public
good. AE Gordon Wood has observed, under this definition, it would
even be possible for a hereditary monarchy to be a republic, if its citi-
zenspossessed the proper self-sacrificing, virtuous spirit.40 And
prior to 1776, it was indeed conceivable that a benign though
nonelective monarchy could be considered republican in America.
But by ·1787, Americans clearly understood that monarchy was in-
compatible with the deepest spirit of republicanism, which required
democratic self-rule. Thus, when Madison in Federalist Number 43
did turn to expounding the Republican Government Clause of Article
IV, these were his first words: "In a confederacy founded on republi-
can principles, and composed of republican members, the superin-
tending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the
system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations."41
So too, in Federalist Number 39, Madison explicitly contradistin-
guished republicanism from "aristocracy" and "monarchy"42 --a con-
38. See also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 32, at 396 (Patrick Henry) (linking
republican government with representation in passing, but not discussing Article IV); 2
id. at 257 (Alexander Hamilton) (similar).
39. This understanding of Republican Government might find support in Cass
Sunstein's general efforts to revive republicanism. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
40. WOOD, supra note 11, at 49, 205-06.
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 274 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240-41 (J~mes Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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tradistinction prominent in many other discussions of the Republican
Government Clause in 1787-88.43
But what, for Madison, was a republic? In Number 39, Madison
linked it with "the capacity of mankind of self-government," where
government derives "all its powers" from "the great body of the peo-
ple";44 and in the above-quoted passage from Number 43, he re-
minded his audience that the Constitution itself was to be "founded
on republican principles."45 As we shall see, these principles were
rooted in majority rule popular sovereignty. Virtue and a willing-
ness to sacrifice for the common good were indeed part of republican-
ism because they were presupposed by the project of democratic self-
government. As Madison put the point in Number 55: "Republican
government presupposes the existence of [virtuous] qualities in a
higher degree than any other form. . .. [Republicanism requires]
sufficient virtue among men for self-government."46
Thus, perhaps a better rendering of the res publica would be that
in a republican government, government must be the people's thing.
Like poplicus, publica ultimately is rooted in a reference to "the
People"--consider also the Latin pubes, in the sense of "adult men."47
Roger Sherman captured this etymological truth well in a 1789 letter
to John Adams noting that "what especially denominates [a govern-
ment] a republic is its dependence on the public or people at large."48
Like the Constitution's more explicit references to "the People" in the
Preamble, and the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, Article IV's
indirect reference to the people tapped into first principles of popular
sovereignty and self-rule by the people.49
To understand this last point most clearly, we must return tothe
Founding, and see it with fresh eyes.
43. See, e.g., 1 RECORDS, supra note 36, at 206 (Edmund Randolph); 2 id. at 48
(Nathaniel Gorham); sources cited supra note 35.
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 42, at 240-41.
45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 41, at 274.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
47. Note the implicit denominator issues packed into this word. Note also how
the sharp distinction posited by the Anti-Direct Democracy Thesis dissolves etymologi-
cally, with the res publica being a rough Latin equivalent of the Greek demos-kratia--
rule by the demos, or people.
48. WIECEK, supra note 35, at 24 (emphasis added).
49. On the significance of these more explicit references, see generally Amar, su-
pra note 3.
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II. THE FOUNDING ERA
We have been taught to look at the Constitution through the
wrong end of the telescope, We have been told that the Bill of Rights
was designed to inhibit majority tyranny and limit popular passion;
and so we have missed the many ways in which it was also struc-
tured to enhance majority rule and promote popular sovereignty. We
have been taught to dwell on the most indirect and filtered parts of
our Constitution such as Article III; and so we have all but ignored
the most directly democratic majoritarian parts of our Constitution,
the Preamble and Article VII, which set out how our Constitution
came to be ordained and established, and which have grand implica-
tions for how it might be altered or abolished. We have been told
that Article V specifies the exclusive mechanism of lawful constitu-
tional change when instead it may specify only the exclusive
mechanism by which ordinary government may alter the Constitu-
tion without recurring to the people themselves. We have been told
that the Preamble's reference to "the People" is essentially meaning-
less; that the Ninth Amendment's reference to "the People" impli-
cates only individual rights like privacy; and that the Tenth
Amendment's reference to "the People" involves only states' rights.
What we miss is how all these references to "the People" are em-
bodiments of the Constitution's unitary structure and overarching
spirit of popular sovereignty--of the people's right to "ordain" and
"establish," and their "reserved" and "retained" rights to alter or
abolish, their Constitution. And when we look at the "Constitution"
as an act and not a text--as a physical, embodied, real-life doing of
ordaining and establishing--we have been taught, by Charles Beard
and his disciples, to treat this constituting act as an antipopulist
'Thermidorian conspiratorial coup. In fact, it was the most participa-
tory, majoritarian (within each state) and populist event that the
planet Earth had ever seen.
I have argued all of these things elsewhere, at great length, and I
shall not here try to cover this ground again, or present all my evi-
dence and arguments.50 Instead, I shall ask a simple question: how
does the concept of Republican Government fit with my earlier
claims about the Preamble, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
50. See generally Amar, supra note 3; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federal-
ism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1425-66 (1987).
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and the Bill of Rights more generally, and the Constitution's overall
structure and spirit?
My answer is that Republican Government fits into this struc-
ture quite snugly. Like the explicit invocations of the people in the
Preamble and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the subtle invoca- .
tion of the people in the Republican Government Clause of Article IV
reaffirms basic principles of popular sovereignty·-of the right of the
people to ordain and establish government, of their right to alter or
abolish it, and of the centrality of popular majority rule, in these ex-
ercises of ultimate popular sovereignty.
A. Popular Sovereignty, The Right To Alter or Abolish, and
Majority Rule
Let me begin in the most unlikely place imaginable--the canoni-
cal Federalist Number 78, the home field of those who would have us
focus first on the Constitution's most filtered, least majoritarian,
least populist place, Article III. The author is none other than Alex-
ander Hamilton, Exhibit A of Charles Beard and his disciples, a man
who, in his heart of hearts, had little faith in the people (unlike, say,
James Wilson). And yet here is what even this man, in even this
place, publicly says about· Republican Government: "I trust the
friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its ene-
mies in questioning that fundamental principle of republican gov-
ernment which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the
established Constitution whenever they· find it inconsistent with
th . h' "51eir appmess ....
Clearly, then, even Hamilton understood--and accepted--the
linkages between Republican Government, popular sovereignty, and
the people's right to alter or abolish. Though he does not explicitly
specify in Number 78 the legal mechanism by which this right may
be exercised, he does appear to imply that this process is majoritar-
ian. A "majority" of the voters, Hamilton says in the remainder of
this passage, cannot simply disregard the written Constitution
whenever they please, or pressure their representatives to do so;
rather they--"the people," says Hamilton--must alter or abolish
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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through the proper legal channels in some "solemn and authoritative
act" such as the calling of a new constitutional convention.52
To see the central role of popular majority rule in altering or
abolishing, however, we. need not stra~ to read between the lines of
Number 78; we need only read the plain words of Hamilton's earlier
Number 21, in a passage where Hamilton is explicitly discussing the
Republican Government Clause of Article IV: "[The clause] could be
no impediment to reforms of State constitutions by a majority of the
people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain un-
diminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be
effected by violence."53
Indeed, in the very next Number we find Hamilton, echoing and
elaborating Madison's nonchalant and unselfconscious dictum in
Number 10: "[A] fundamental maxim of republican government ...
requires that the sense of the majority should prevail."54
Now turn to James Madison, today viewed as the great champion
of minority rights. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson written only
weeks before the publication of Number 10, Madison invoked "the
republican principle which refers the ultimate decision to the will of
the majority."55 This point he reformulated almost fifty years later
as follows: "the vital principle of republican government is the lex
majoris partis, the will of the majority."56 And Madison's observa-
tions in The Federalist consistently linked Republican Government
with popular self-rule, the people's right to alter or abolish, and the
role of popular majority rule in moments of constitutional founding
and change.
As we have already seen, Madison begins his famous Number 39
by linking Republican Government with "the capacity of mankind for
self government."57 He then asks, ''What, then, are the distinctive
characters of the republican form?"58 He notes that under some
loose definitions, even aristocratic or monarchical regimes might
52. [d. at 469·70 (emphasis added).
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 361 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (labeling majority rule "the fundamental principle offree government").
55. 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 206, 212 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles P.
Hobson eds., 1977) (letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787».
56. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF APARTY SYSTEM 208 (1969).
57. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 42, at 240.
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claim to be republics, but in post Revolutionary America, these defi-
nitions will not do. Republicanism must be defined as against aris-
tocracy and monarchy--as "a government which derives all its pow-
ers ... from the great body of the people"59 --echoing his line in
Number 37 that the "genius of republican liberty ... demand[s] that
all power should be derived from the people."60
But how, exactly, would the federal Constitution establish a truly
republican government "deriv[ing] all its powers" from the people?
In part through the practice of elections for officers, but even more
fundamentally, through the act of popular ordainment and estab-
lishment of the Constitution itself. As Madison reminds his readers
when he turns to expound the Republican Government Clause of Ar-
ticle IV in Number 43, the federal Constitution will itself be "founded
on republican principles"61 ••"founded," as he puts the same point in
Number 39, "on the assent and ratification of the people of America,
given by deputies elected for the special purpose."62 . These special
conventions of the people, Madison explicitly notes in Number 40,
would act by simple majorities;63 and in Number 39 he observes that
in a nonfederal republican regime, at least, "majority of the people"
would be "competent at all times ... to alter or abolish its established
government."64
Publius was not alone in linking Republican Government to
popular sovereignty and majority rule. Samuel Johnson's 1786 dic-
tionary defined "Republican" as "Placing the government in the peo-
ple";65 and various ratification era pamphlets and speeches defined
republican government as one in which "the people are sovereign,"66
"the people are consequently the fountain of all power,"67 "laws are
derived from the consent of the people,"68 and power resides in "the
hands of the people at large."69 In his most famous Supreme Court
59. [d. at 240-41 (emphasis added).
60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 227 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
61. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 41.
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 42, at 243.
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 251 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 42, at 246.
65. Merritt, supra note 20, at 24 n.130 (citation omitted).
66. [d. (citation omitted).
67. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 32, at 298 (Edmund Pendleton).
68. Merritt, supra note 20, at 24 n.130 (citation omitted).
69. [d. at 35 (citation omitted); see also supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text
(quoting other ratification speeches linking Republican Government and rule by the
people).
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opinion, in the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia, the great Justice
James Wilson--signer of both the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution, one of the Constitution's two most important Fram-
ers, and the leading lawyer in America--offered a "short definition" of
Republican Government as "one constructed on the principle, that
the Supreme Power resides in the body of the people."70 Two years
later, Justice James Iredell delivered an opinion noting that in "a
Republic" the "sovereignty resides in the great body of the people."71
Likewise, in a 1792 newspaper essay, James Madison described a
"republican government" as one rooted in the ideas that "mankind
are capable of governing themselves" and that "the Government be
administered in the spirit and form approved by the great body of the
people."72 In his First Inaugural Address, Thomas Jefferson de-
scribed majority rule as "the vital principle of republics"73 --a point
he later formulated as follows: "the first principle of Republicanism
is, that the lex majoris partis is the fundamental law of every society
of equal rights. To consider the will of the society announced by the
majority of a single vote as sacred as if unanimous is the first of all
lessons of importance."74 In a similar vein, former Philadelphia
Convention delegate Caleb Strong noted that "in republicks, the
opinion of the majority must prevail."75
It is tempting for modern readers to dismiss all this talk of
popular sovereignty, altering or abolishing, and majority rule as
mere theoretical speculation, unimportant window dressing or, more
darkly, dishonest posturing. Yet this temptation only reflects the
tremendous distortions created by looking at the Constitution
through the wrong end of the telescope. Ordinary, day-to-day gov-
ernment under the Constitution might be both highly filtered and
supermajoritarian; but if these rules themselves had been approved
by popular majorities, and could be changed by them, the essence of
the Constitution Publius was far more Republican than modern cyn-
ics acknowledge. The words of The Federalist were indeed "rhetoric"
70. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793).
71. Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 93 (1795).
72. James Madison, A Candid Estate of Parties, Nat'l Gazette, Sept. 22, 1792, in
14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 370,371 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
73. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in GREAT ISSUES, supra note 9, at
186,189.
74. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron F. H. Alexander Von Humboldt (June
13, 1817), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 89 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1899).
75. HOFSTADTER, supra note 56, at 143.
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designed to "persuade" and "justify"--but they were trying to per-
suade majorities in each state to ratify the Constitution. These
words were written to justify the exercise of majority rule popular
sovereignty, which provided the foundation of the Constitution itself.
Majority rule popular sovereignty was not mere theory but embodied
practice: in assembled conventions, the people of each state were
exercising their rights to alter their existing state constitution and to
help ordain and establish a new continental constitution. And
they--"We, the People"--were doing all this, state by state, by simple
majority rule--30-27 in New York; 187-168 in Massachusetts; 57-47
in New Hampshire; 89-79 in Virginia; and so on.76 These conven-
tions sprang to life via special elections in which a greater "mass of
the people" was eligible to vote than ever before.77 Until we see all
this--and begin to take it seriously--we simply cannot understand the
American Constitution in word, deed, or spirit.
B. The Denominator Problem
Nor can we begin to understand and grapple with the big and
difficult issues raised by the Constitution's words, deeds, and
spirit--what I am calling here "the denominator problem." As we
shall see, from 1780 to 1870, much of American constitutional
history--state, federal, and territorial--can be seen as variations on
this denominator problem.
1. The Geography Problem
The first question to ask is, which majority should ultimately
rule--a majority of each state people, or a majority of the continental
people? Prior to the ordainment and establishment of the U.S. Con-
stitution, the answer was clear in both the Constitution and The
Federalist: the people of each state. Under Article VII, the Consti-
tution would go into' effect only in those states whose peoples had
ratified it; no state could be bound without the consent of its own
people, as expressed by a majority of a special popular convention
within that state. As Madison observed in Number 39:
76. See Amar, supra note 3, at 486-87.
77. See infra text accompanying note 100.
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Were the people regarded in this transaction as [already]
forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people
of the United States would bind the minority, in the same
manner as the majority in each State must bind the minor-
ity. ... [Instead, however, e]ach State, in ratifying the Consti-
tution, is considered as a sovereign body independent of all
others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act.78
These rules for ratification made good common sense and legal
sense. Each of the thirteen states had been founded at a different
time, with a unique colonial history and charter. Each had its own
constitution after 1776. The states had indeed leagued together in
the Articles of Confederation, but the Articles were a mere treaty
among thirteen separate nations, each of which. expressly retained
its sovereignty. Under. standard principles of international law, the
notorious and widespread violations of that treaty in the 1780's freed
each contracting party--each state--to withdraw (secede, if you will)
from the treaty in 1787-88 by ratifying the federal. Constitution.
Until a new nation had been formed, no state could speak for any
other; in 1787, a national ratification convention would have been
pure bootstrap.79
But once Americans had ratified the new U.S. Constitution and
formed "a more perfect union" would each state people continue to be
sovereign and independent? Under the Constitution, which majority
should ultimately rule--a majority of the people of the United States,
or a majority of the people of each state? Here was the momentous
question that led to civil war. Jefferson Davis insisted that the peo-
ple of each state continued to be sovereign; and that just as a simple
majority of a specially called South Carolina convention had seceded
from the Articles to join the Union in 1788, so too a simple majority
of a specially called South Carolina convention could secede from the
Union to join the Confederacy in 1860. Abraham Lincoln was no less
committed to ultimate majority rule and Republican Govern-
mento-indeed, his First Inaugural Address brilliantly defended ma-
jority rule80 --but Lincoln believed that the denominator was na-
tional, not statewide. The United States was a nation, and ulti-
78. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 42, at 244 (emphasis added).
79. See generally Arnar, supra note 3; Akhil Reed Arnar, Of Sovereignty and Fed-
eralism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1425-66 (1987).
80. See infra note 111.
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mately sovereignty lay in the national people, acting in accordance
with the fundamental principle of Republics, majority rule.
In The Federalist Number 39, Madison tried to straddle the mo-
mentous issue of the geographic denominator. The new Constitu-
tion, he argued, was neither
wholly national nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national,
the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the major-
ity of the people of the Union; and this authority would be com-
petent at all times, like that of a majority of every national so-
ciety to alter or abolish its established government.81
Yet in denying that the Constitution did ultimately empower a
majority of the people of the Union--as his fellow Federalist James
Wilson apparently believed--Madison left us with a huge puzzle: if
the people of neither South Carolina nor America could abolish the
Constitution by majority action, because the Constitution was nei-
ther wholly federal nor national, what happened to Madison's fun-
damental principle of Republican Government?82
2. The Demography Problem
The Founding raised another momentous denominator question
that also foreshadowed the Civil War debate. Within any given
state, which persons constituted the relevant people, a majority of
whom should ultimately rule under the Republican principle? On
what occasions might those persons exercise their ultimate sover-
eignty? In elaborating on the Republican Government Clause of Ar-
ticle IV, Madison tiptoed up to these demographic denominator and
procedural questions, and gave us some key clues and prescient pre-
dictions:
At first view, it might seem not to square with the republi-
can theory to suppose either that a majority have not the right,
or that a minority will have the force, to subvert a government;
and consequently that the federal interposition can never be
required but when it would be improper. But theoretic reason-
ing, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the les-
sons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for pur-
81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 42, at 246.
82. I explore this puzzle in Amar, supra note 3, at 506-08.
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poses of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a
State ... ?
Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the same
side in republican governments? May not the minor party pos-
sess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military tal-
ents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers,
as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? ...
May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of citizens may be-
come a majority of persons, by the accession of alien residents,
of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the con-
stitution of the state has not admitted to the rights of suf-
frage?83
Madison's analysis, building on earlier notes to himself in his
now-famous ''Vices of the Political System of the United States,"84
begins by reminding us that in a Republican Government, not every-
thing a majority does is lawful. A majority must act through the
proper, peaceful legal channelS-osuch as conventions--rather than
through appeals to brute force, or (as Hamilton will remind his read-
ers in Number 78)85 unprincipled pressure on officials to ignore ex-
tant, unrepealed constitutional provisions. This concern about ma-
jority compliance with formal niceties would prove remarkably pre-
scient, for as we shall see, the Rhode Island Civil War in the 1840's
would hinge on technical issues of legal formality: even if the Peo-
ple's Party, led by Thomas Dorr, constituted the clear majority party
in Rhode Island, had they properly jumped through the requisite
procedural hoops in ratifying their "People's Constitution"?
Madison's next point is in some respects the flip side of all this.
Even if a lawful majority of the duly constituted, legally relevant
"people" authorizes a regime through strict compliance with all for-
mal niceties, that lawful majority may lack the muscle to make its
will and judgment stick. De jure authority does not guarantee d.e
facto power; right does not always make might. A voting minority,
Madison reminds his audience, might have a majority of the guns, or
the wealth. It might also have the backing of outsid.ers--"foreign
powers," "alien residents" or "a casual concourse of adventurers."
Here too, Madison proved a prophet, as we shall see in the 1850's
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 41, at 276-77.
84. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER 57,59 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981).
85. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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controversy over majority rule "popular sovereignty" in Kansas, in
which the role of outsider "border ruffians" loomed large.
Most intriguing of all, Madison reminds his audience that a mi-
nority of the lawful voters might be backed by the outsiders
within--those permanent residents of a Republic "whom the Consti-
tution has not admitted to the rights of suffrage." In Number 52,
Madison returns to this point, reminding his readers that "[t]he
definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a funda-
mental article of republican government."86 In focusing on the dis-
enfranchised in Number 43, Madison does not appear to be thinking
primarily of women--alas, almost no major participant in Founding
era deliberations appeared to be thinking primarily of women. Who,
then, is on his mind first and foremost? In his very next 'sentence, he
describes them:
an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the
States, who, during'the calm of regular government, are sunk
below the level of men; but who, iIi tempestuous scenes of civil
violence, may emerge into the human character and give a su-
periority of strength to any party with which they may associ-
ate themselves.87
In a word: slaves. And here again we see the seeds of future discord
within the tradition of Republican Government. How could slaves
simply be excluded from "the People" by definitional fiat?
As Madison recognized in Number 39, the "essence[]" of Republi-
can Government was "that it be derived from the great body of the
society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of
it."88 How was a favored caste of race any more Republican than a
favored caste of noblemen, especially in ~ny state where blacks con-
stituted a majority or near majority of the population? Could a Re-
public truly exist half slave and half free? Here was the other great
denominator question, long repressed,bursting open with the Civil
War. And once slaves were freed in the South, did not Republican
Government principles require that the large mass of now-free black
men in the South be allowed to participate in electing constitutional
conventions? This was the burning question of Reconstruction--and
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 41, at 277.
88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 42, at·241 (emphasis in original).
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one that, as we shall see, was explicitly debated in terms of the Re-
publican Government Clause of Article IV.
Before we leave Madison's remarkable ruminations, let us, fi-
nally, note his initial description of "Republican Theory" in his 1787
notes to himself: "According to Republican Theory, Right and power
[are] both vested in the majority."89 Though we have seen how, de-
scriptively, this tight linkage of right and might fails, Republican
theory did indeed try to bring right and might into rough alignment.
In a stable and healthy Republic, economic and military power
should be distributed in ways that broadly corresponded with the
distribution of formal political power. Voters would not possess
mathematically identical wealth shares,. even as they possessed ex-
actly equal votes; but wild extremes of both wealth and poverty were
un-Republican, and should be discouraged.90 Roughly speaking,
those who voted equally should be equally armed, and those who
bore arms militarily should vote.
Over and over, and across the centuries, we can see this Republi-
can Theory inscribed in the text of our Constitution. The Second
Amendment's two clauses equated the "well regulated militia" with
"the People"91 --the same people who in the Preamble "ordain[ed] and
establish[ed] this Constitution,"92 who enjoyed a First Amendment
right to "assemble" in conventions (and elsewhere),93 and who
"retain[ed]" and "reserv[ed] their "rights" and "powers" to alter or
abolish (and other rights and powers) in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.94 Indeed, an early draft of the Second Amendment,
later shortened for purely stylistic reasons, pointedly defined the
89. Madison, supra note 84, at 59. As Professor Wiecek has noted. Madison had
expressed the point even earlier in a February 1787 Congressional debate concerning
Shay's Rebellion: "the principles of Republican Govts .... as they rest on the sense of
the majority, necessarily suppose power and right to be on the same side." WIECEK,
supra note 35, at 40 (citation omitted). For an excellent analysis of the role of Shay's
Rebellion in the genesis of the Republican Government Clause, see id. at 27-42: For
Madison's statement at Philadelphia that "According to Republican theory" right and
power are both vested "in the majority," see 1RECORDS, supra note 36, at 318.
90. See WOOD, supra note 11, at 22, 64, 72, 89, 100, 402. See generally Akhil Reed
Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory ofMinimal Entitlements, 13 HARv.
J.L. & PuB. POL'y 37 (1990).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
92. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
94. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X.
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"militia" as "composed of the body of the People."95 Section Two of
the Fourteenth Amendment defined a state's presumptive electorate
as "male inhabitants of [a] State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens"--roughly speaking, the same group that constituted the
state's general militia.96 The Fifteenth Amendment entitled black
men to vote long before women of all races became eligible, in part
because black men had borne arms for their country and provided
the Union the margin of victory.97 When it became clear that wars
had ceased to be highly structured, ritualized competitions between
armies of men, but instead pitted entire societies and economies
against each other, women won the vote under the Nineteenth
Amendment. Indeed, Woodrow Wilson and other politicians explic-
itly endorsed women's suffrage in recognition of women's role as eco-
nomic soldiers in the war effort against Germany.98 And more re-
cently, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment extended the vote to young
adults on the theory that if they were old enough to bear arms in
Vietnam, they were old enough to vote on the wisdom of that war,
and on all else.99
The same Republican linkage emerges if we focus on the Consti-
tution as an act--as an embodied ordaining and establishing--rather
than as a mere text. In various states, it appears that militiamen
who had borne arms for the Revolution were part of "the People" who
elected delegates to specially-called ratifying conventions, regardless
of whether these militiamen met the property qualifications for vot-
ing for ordinary state legislatures.100
These, then, were the words and deeds of the Founding era, re-
flecting both the central meaning of Republican Government, and
the problems raised by that central meaning. And let us not say that
all this is irrelevant today--that the Founding has nothing to say to
us, or that all the wrinkles were ironed out by later struggles with
happy endings (e.g., the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments).
95. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 214(1957).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
97. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1164 n.152 (1991).
98. [d.
99. [d.
100. See, e.g., Samuel B. Harding, Party Struggles Over the First Pennsylvania
Constitution, in ANNuAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL AsSOCIATION FOR THE
YEAR 1894, at 371,371-75 (1895); WOOD, supra note 11, at 289.
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Are the extremes of wealth and poverty today--among equal citizens,
equal voters--truly compatible with the spirit of Republican Govern-
ment? Are our campaign finance rules, or First Amendment cases
that seem to privilege capitalism over democracy, and inequality over
equality? Is our system of ,financing education, or teaching our
young, compatible with the goal of producing Republican citizens,
capable of individual and collective self-government? If women are
truly equal Republican citizens after the Nineteenth Amendment~
how can we tolerate discrimination in our Armed Forces on the basis
of sex? (Of course, as Republican theory might predict, this dis-
crimination is then used by men to silence women in key political
debates: "You never saw combat, so how can you know ... ?") Most
generally: does the citizenry today really understand its awesome
rights and responsibilities in a Republican Government rooted in the
"capacity of mankind for self-government"?
III. THE ANTEBELLUM ERA
In the seventy years between the Founding and the Civil War,
the central meaning of Republican Government was carried forth
and acted out on the state and territorial stage. In state after state
"the People" adopted new state constitutions via specially called con-
ventions acting under majority rule. In many states, these conven-
tions were not explicitly provided for by the pre-existing state consti-
tution; and in some states, a special amendment clause of the old
state constitution, looking rather like the U.S. Constitution's Article
V, seemed at first to specify the exclusive mechanism of constitu-
tional change and to impliedly prohibit these specially called con-
ventions; but no matter. Over and over, Americans proved--by their
deeds as well as their words--that these Article V analogues were not
exclusive; that the people were sovereign; and that in a Republican
Government the people might always assemble in properly called
conventions to alter or abolish existing constitutions by majority
rule. And as Americans pushed relentlessly westward, they poured
into new territories, organized them into new states, and founded
state constitutions (subject to ultimate congressional approval) on
the Republican Government principle of majority rule popular sov-
ereignty.
I shall not here try to document this extraordinary implementa-
tion of the Republican Government, state by state, territory by terri-
tory, year by year, for a proper telling of this tale would be a book (at
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least). And at least one excellent book already provides much of the
documentation and theoretical elaboration: Roger Sherman Hoar's
Constitutional Conventions,101 a must read for all who seek to learn
what Republican Government meant on the ground, for those who
followed the Founders, and were, in their own way, Founders, too.
Most rema,rkable is what wa~ not said in antebellum debates.
Almost no one denied that the people are sovereign; that they may
alter or abolish their governments lawfully and peacefully through
properly called conventions; or that the proper voting rule for popu-
lar sovereignty in making or changing constitutions is simple major-
ity rule. Almost no one, for' example, argued that conventions or
popular ratification must be supermajoritarian.
Rather, debate swirled within majority rule popular sovereignty.
Was a convention properly called? Who were the relevant legal peo-
ple, who could act by simple majority rule in constitutional moments?
These were the questions on which men broke, and over w~ich they
at times came to blows. Thus· the central meaning of Republican
Government explains not only the many success stories of antebel-
lum popular sovereignty, but also some of its spectacular failures.
Here, we shall briefly consider the two most dramatic, from Rhode
Island and Kansas. What is most noteworthy about those two epi-
sodes is how key participants tried to frame their words and deeds
within the ideology of majority rule popular sovereignty, exploiting
some of the ambiguities within that ideology--the problem of the de-
nominator.
A. Dorr's Rebellion
To do justice to the words and deeds underlying the Rhode Island
Civil War--a.k.a. Dorr's Rebellion--would, once again, require a book.
Let me ruthlessly compress by quoting at .length from Roger Sher-
man Hoar, and invite you to observe the centrality of majority rule
and procedural denominator problems in the Dorr Affair:
[Allthough the people·are supreme, they have no method of
expression except through their representatives, the voters;
and they in tum can only speak by means of elections regularly
called and held.
101. ROGER S. HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE, POWERS,
AND LIMITATIONS (1917).
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It was this little technical point alone which justified the
prosecution of Thomas W. Dorr for supporting the "People's
Constitution" of 1841 in Rhode Island. Under his leadership
the people of that State attempted to overthrow the tyrannous
rule of the landholding classes who were still entrenched be-
hind the King's charter. Caucuses of the adult male citizens
throughout the State sent delegates to a convention which
submitted a fair and democratic constitution to a special elec-
tion called by it. At this election a clear majority of all the
adult males voted for the new frame of government. Not only
this, but among those voting :in favor was a clear majority of
those duly registered as voters under the charter. Dorr was
subsequently elected Governor. He attempted to assume office,
but John Tyler, Whig President of the United States, interfered
at the request of the Whig charter government, and forced Dorr
and many of his followers into exile, by threatening to send
Federal troops into the State. This partisan action, by the way,
is chiefly what drove the Whigs from power in the succeeding
national election. Equally partisan was the Democratic con-
gressional report on Tyler's action ....
On Dorr's return, a few years later, he was tried and con-
victed of high treason. In the meantime, the Charterists them-
selves had submitted a constitution, which had received the
votes of less than one third of the adult males, less than half of
the registered vote.
Yet technically this became the constitution of the State,
and the People's Constitution did not. Neither method of pro-
cedure was authorized by the charter. The valid one received
seven thousand votes; the invalid one nearly fourteen thou-
sand. Yet the difference in validity lay in this: the seven thou-
sand voted at a duly called election, and hence had authority to
speak for the whole people; whereas the fourteen thousand
voted at an irregular election, and hence spoke only for them-
selves.102
775
In contrast to Hoar's Dorr-leaning account, consider the lan-
guage of an 1842 letter from a leader of the (:harter faction to Presi-
dent Tyler, challenging the Dorrites' majoritarian bona fides:
[The issue is wlhether their constitution shall be carried
out by force of arms, without a majority; or the present gov-
102. [d. at 21-22.
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emment be supported until a constitution can be agreed upon
that will command a majority. . .. Nearly all the leaders, who
are professional men, have abandoned them, on the ground
that a majority is not in favor of their constitution.103
Dorr's Rebellion generated the famous case of Luther v. Bor-
den,104 which gave the U.S. Supreme Court its first big chance to
opine on the Republican Government Clause of Article IV. Borden,
an officer of the Charter government had, under orders, forciblyen-
tered Luther's house, and Luther sued in trespass. In defense, Bor-
den pled his orders. If the Charter government was indeed the law-
ful government of Rhode Island, Borden's defense would hold; but if
the Dorrite regime was the lawful government, then Borden stood as
a mere private citizen, a naked tortfeasor stripped of all governmen-
tal immunity.
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to decide for itself which of the
two contending regimes was the lawful government of Rhode Island;
and its ruling has today come to stand for the broad proposition that
the Republican Government Clause of Article IV is. not justiciable.
But a narrower reading of Luther's holding makes much more sense.
The key issue in the case was not whether the charter regime was
Republican, but whether it was a Government. Perhaps both the
charter and the Dorrite regimes met minimal conditions of demo-
cratic legitimacy--even if one denominator was better than the other,
both were plausible, and so both regimes were arguably Republican
"enough," even if one was "more" Republican. However, only one
regime could be the actual Government of Rhode Island. Thus, the
real question in Luther was akin to the international question of
"recognition"--a question committed to the federal political branches
under our Constitution. Indeed, especially strong reasons counseled
deference to the judgments of the federal political branches in an in-
trastate civil war, for well before any definitive federal court action,
the President would typically have committed himself to support one
of the regimes as the lawful government, and the House and Senate
might have seated representatives of that regime. A later federal
court decision backing the other regime could lead to chaos, undoing
all governmental action--marriages, land transfers, criminal convic-
tions and the like--that had taken place in the interim.
103. WIECEK, supra note 35, at 96 (letter of John Whipple to President John Ty-
ler, Apr. 9, 1842) (emphasis omitted).
104. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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Yet none of this would follow from a typical Republican Govern-
ment case today, deciding whether a particular action or regime was
Republican rather than whether it came from a Government. (It is of
course sophistic to argue that if, say, Tennessee's malapportionment
scheme in Baker v. Carr105 had been deemed un-Republican by the
Supreme' Court, Tennessee would somehow have ceased to be a
"Government"; under that logic, a state that violates equal protection
would likewise not be a "state," yet no one thinks that.)
In any event, putting justiciability issues to one side, let us recall
what the Luther Court said on the merits, about the principles un-
derlying the Republican Government· Clause, and the' Constitution
generally: "No one, we believe, has ever doubted the proposition,
that, according to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in
every State resides in the people of the State, and that they may al-
ter and change their form of government at their own pleasure."106
Consider also the oral argument of Luther's dazzling lawyer,
Benjamin Franklin Hallett:
[T]he great body of people may change their form of gov-
ernment at any time, in any peaceful way, and by any mode of
operations that they themselves determine to be expedient.
. . . and the mode they do adopt, when adopted, ratified, or
acquiesced in by a majority of all the people, is binding upon
all.107
Again and again, in countless passages, Hallett hammered home the
linkages between simple majority rule, popular sovereignty, the
people's right to alter or abolish, and the concept of Republican Gov-
ernment.108 The Federalist Number 43, not Number 10, was Hal-
let's canonical text on Republican Government, and it, Hallet argued,
affirmed "the rights ofmajorities."109
105. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
106. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 47.
107. [d. at 24.
108. Hallett's remarkable oral argument, published in 1848, is a must read for,
serious students of Republican Government. See BENJAMIN F. HALLE'IT, THE RIGHT OF
THE PEoPLE TO ESTABLISH FORMS OF GoVERNMENT (1848).
109. [d. at 27.
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B. Bleeding Kansas
If the issues underlying Dorr's Rebellion--or even the fact that a
brief and unbloody civil war took place in Rhode Island in the
.1840's--are known today only to 'a handful of scholars, the story of
"bleeding Kansas" is a stock part of high school American history.
Rather than recounting this well-known episode at length, I shall
simply remind you of how snugly the most basic facts of the affair fit
into our account of the central meaning of Republic Government:
"Popular sovereignty" was the watchword of Stephen Douglas and
his allies--indeed; he hoped to ride to the Presidency astride this
powerful slogan for deciding the fate of the Kansas Territory. But
which people were sovereign? (The ubiquitous denominator prob-
lem.) Squatters? "Border ruffians" who poured over from neighbor-
ing Missouri to intervene in Kansas affairs, yet had little intention of
living in Kansas? Which (if either) of two competing constitu-
tions--each claiming to have t)le support of a popular majority of
Kansans--was the lawful constitution of Kansas? What happened
when one side called an election and the other side boycotted? Could
a simple majority of those actually voting--as opposed to those eligi-
ble to vote-.-suffice to ratify a constitution? Here too, only once we
rediscover the central meaning of Republican Government, and the
problems raised within that meaning, can we understand the most
basic issues and events in American history.
IV. THE CIVIL WAR ERA
The line from the Kansas civil war to the American civil war is
easy to trace--through the birth of the Republican Party in Kansas'
wake; the brutal caning ofCharles Sumner on the floor of the Senate
in retaliation for his 1856 "Crime Against Kansas" speech; the 1857
bombshell of Dred Scott,110 and the difficulties. it p!>sed for a
"popular sovereignty" solution to slavery in Kansas and other terri-
tories; the showdown between Stephen Douglas and James Bucha-
nan over Kansas, foreshadowing the eventual splintering of the
Democratic Party; the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858, and their
strong emphasis on Kansas and popular sovereignty; the polarizing
armed raid on Harper's Ferry in 1859, led by John Brown, freshly
returned from his armed struggles in Kansas; Sumner's June 1860
110. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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"Barbarism of Slavery" speech on the proposed admission of Kansas
as a free state; the November 1860 election of Lincoln; and the quick
secessions that followed. '
Equally easy to trace--though more surprising to some--are the
remarkable similarities between Jefferson Davis' and Abraham Lin-
coln's constitutional theories. Both had been shaped by the Ameri-
can Republican Government tradition, emphasizing majority rule
popular sovereignty. Jefferson Davis, after all, insisted that even the
slimmest majority in a secession convention strictly bound the minor-
ity, however passionate, to lawful obedience. The people had spoken,
through the proper procedures, claimed Davis,' and their majority
verdict was Supreme Law in a Republic whose geographic bounda-
ries had already been defined by pre-existing laws. Lincoln was no
less passionate about majority rule and popular sovereignty111_-
government "of the people, by the people, and for the people"112 --but
disagreed about the ge'ographic and demographic denominator. The
people of the United States,' and not of each state; were sovereign;
and in a stable Republic, slavery had no place in the long run.
Blacks could not simply be excluded by a definitional fiat. Either
they had to be physically excluded--through colonization--or, if they
continued to stay, they eventually had to become Republican citizens
and voters. Early in his administration, Lincoln strongly pushed the
first option; but before his death he gave signs that he was growing
towards the second, largely in recognition that black men had borne
arms nobly and well for the Union flag--their flag.113
Lincoln did not live long enough to resolve the denominator
problem raised by black Americans, and the great task fell to the Re-
construction Congress. The issue arose in a variety of contexts, most
prominently: (1) Congress's decision not to automatically readmit
Southern states that continued to e'xclude now-free black men from
state constitutional conventions called to repudiate ordinances of se-
cession and restore their states to their proper role within the Union;
(2) congressional support for Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, reducing a state's congressionaJ representation in proportion
to its disenfranchisement of blacks in ordinary elections; and (3)
111, See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in GREAT ISSUES, supra note
'9, at 389, 393 ("A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and
always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is
the only true sovereign of a free people.").
112. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, in id. at 414-15.
113. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 6-11, 49,74 (1988).
HeinOnline -- 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 780 1993-1994
780 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
Congress's ultimate decision to propose the Fifteenth Amendment,
barring racial discrimination in voting.
I shall consider only the first context here, because of the par-
ticular prominence in this context of the Republican Government
Clause of Article IV in congressional deliberations. As we have seen,
Luther v. Borden 114 had stressed the special role of the nonjudicial
branches of the federal government in implementing this clause, es-
pecially in deciding whether to seat representatives from a given re-
gime in the House and Senate. In refusing to seat Southern repre-
sentatives, leading members of Congress explicitly defended their
'actions by pointing to Luther and the Republican Government
Clause. Congress did not speak with one voice in these mat-
ters--important variations existed among and within the different
wings of the Republican party--and congressional action came under
intense attack, especially from Andrew Johnson. Congress's even-
tual response was to use all the arrows in its quiver--including im-
peachment and jurisdiction stripping--to prevail. A Supreme Court
that saw what happened to a President who challenged Congress's
theory of the Republican Government Clause took pains to avert a
showdown of its own with Congress115 --and even years later, would
reflexively jerk away from any case implicating this dangerous
clause.116 (Thus, it was the Reconstruction experience, and not just
the dicta in Luther, that made the Clause a nonjusticiable hot potato
for the Court at the turn of the century.)117
Congress's arguments on behalf of excluding Southern states
have not been treated with particular respect by some modern law-
yers. My colleague Bruce Ackerman, for example, has implied that
114. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1(1849).
115. Judicial retreats include Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866);
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); and Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506 (1868).
In Stanton, Georgia openly invited the Court to opine on the Republican Govern-
ment Clause. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 65 (oral argument). The Court declined the invitation.
One year later, after some of the dust had settled, the Court did discuss the Clause, only
to pointedly reaffirm Luther and broad power in the political branches of the federal
government. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729-30 (1869).
116. See, e.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
117. Also relevant was an ill-starred attempted intervention by a lower federal
court in a Dorr-like crisis in Louisiana in 1872. For a nice discussion, see WIECEK, supra
note 35, at 226-30. Nor should we forget the legitimacy crisis triggered by the Presi-
dential election of 1876, and the critical and highly controversial role of Supreme Court
Justice Bradley in throwing the uncertain election to Rutherford B. Hays, who in tum
promised to end Reconstruction.
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the exclusion was unprincipled and illegal--a naked power grab hard
to square with the Constitution's text and structure, or with the the-
ory of union championed by Lincoln during the war.118 The issue is,
I think, considerably more intricate and interesting than Ackerman
implies--and once again takes us to the key linkage between Republi-
can Government and majority rule.
Piecing together arguments made at various times in the Recon-
struction Congress, we could understand Congress's argument to go
something like this: "Prior to the Civil War, slave states could ex-,
clude slaves from their denominator and yet still be considered Re-
publican. Just as aliens were no part of the People, so too with
slaves. But once the Emancipation Proclamation forever freed
Southern slaves, the situation changed radically. Free black men
were part of the People, and had been from the Founding, as Justice
Curtis proved conclusively in his Dred Scott dissent. Free black men
must therefore be allowed to participate in state conventions; if not,
these states would not be Republican. The fact that most Northern
states have excluded blacks from political participation is beside the
point, and does not make these states similarly un-Republican. In
the North, free blacks make up only a tiny proportion of the free
male population, so any exclusion is de minimis. In the South, the
situation is radically different. Blacks constitute a majority in three
states; over forty percent in five; and over twenty-five percent in the
remaining three. To exclude black men in these states would be to
exclude a large mass of. the free male citizenry--and that would be
un-Republican under Madison's definition in The Federalist Number
39. Women and children, of course may be, and always have been,
excluded from the political people--just as they can be excluded from
military arms bearing--but a sizable proportion of the adult free male
population may not be."119
Within the general contours of this congressional argument lay
important ambiguities and variations. Did the majority rule princi-
ple allow excluding a forty-nine percent minority at the convention
threshold; or must all important segments of the population be in-
cluded at the outset, perhaps only to lose within a convention? Did
118. See Bruce Ackerman, Discovering The Constitution (1986) (unpublished
draft, on file with author).
119. For a similar reading of this strand of Republican thought, see WIECEK, su-
pra note 35, at 191, 200-01. For the racial population statistics of the South, see FONER;
supra note 113, at 294. On the historical status of free blacks, see Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 571-88 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
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Republican Government require only inclusivity at the convention
stage, or must blacks also be given a role in electing ordinary gov-
ernment officials? (Recall that the Rhode Island and Kansas experi-
enceshad dramatized the ways in which even the people's right to
alter or abolish outside government could, as a practical matter, be
impaired by the actions and inactions of ordinary government offi-
cials hostile to popular sovereignty.) A definitive assessment of the
ultimate correctness or plausibility of Congress's argument' would
require attending to these and other questions, but my task here is
more modest--to show how the arguments of leading Congressmen fit
snugly within' the framework of the central meaning of Republican
Government.
As early as 1837, we find leading abolitionist literature presaging
the argument that would find voice in Congress thirty years later.
Here is an important tract from James' Birney, whose theories on
many topics literally become the party line of the Republican Party:
"[The Constitution] guarantees to every state in the union a republi-
can form of government, Art. IV sec. 4th. A majority of the people of
South Carolina were slaves; can she be said, properly to have a re-
publican form of government?"120 .
Though Birney used the Republican Government Clause to at-
tack slavery itself--at least in South Carolina--Reconstruction Re-
publicans had the historically easier task of deploying the Clause to
include free black men in the pO,lity. In June 1864, Senator Charles
Sumner rose to oppose admitting William Fishback from Arkansas
into the Senate on the grounds that the alleged government that sent
Fishback to Washington represented only "a minority" of the "people"
of Arkansas.121 . "Unquestionably, it is according to the genius of our
Government' that a majority should rule. A majority is the n'atural
base of a republic. To fou:nd~'republic on ,a minority is scarcely less
impracticable than to stand a' pyramid on its apex."122 Sumner wEmt
on to quote Luther v. Borden's explicit language affirJ;l1ing Congress's
power to decline to seat representatives of regimes that were not re-
publican governmentl), and urged hi~ colleagues not to "forget the
principles of republican institutions, which are .offended by the rule
of a minority."123
120. HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 231 (1968).
121. CONGo GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2897 (1864).
122. [d.
123. [d. at 2898-99.
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Early in the 39th Congress, Democratic Congressman Boyer re-
sponded to Sumner with a demographic denominator taunt of his
own: "[If the idea of republican government requires black,suffrage,]
then women should vote, for the same reason; and the New England
States themselves are only pretended republics because their women
who, are in a considerable majoritY,are denied the right of suf-
frage."124 .
Speaking two weeks later, the New England Republican Thomas
Eliot did not respond directly to Boyer's taunt, but did say that a
state had no right "to disenfranchise large masses of its citizens."125
Considerably more elaboration on the topic came from Higby of Cali-
fornia and John Bingham of Ohio. Higby went first:
[M]y friend here from Ohio, [Mr. Bingham,] to whom I intend
to yield a portion of my time, will attempt to explain how it is
that a Government can be republican in fonn, and yet exclude,
if need be, one half of the population from the elective fran-
chise. . ' .
There was not one of the slave States where a large pro-
portion of the population was not black.
[Any state that excludes] one half of its population from
the right of suffrage ... will not be republican in form. 126
So far so good. But Higby then went on to broaden his claim, argu-
ing that any racial exclusion in the franchise would be unconstitu-
tional. A colleague pounced immediately, forcing Higby to concede
under questioning that under this broader test, almost all states, in-
cluding Higby's own California, flunked.127
Bingham was far more careful and took pains to state his de-
no~nator with some precision:
[U]nder the Confederation the majority of male free citi-
zens of full age held the right to the elective franchise in every
State then in the Union ....
124. CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1866) (emphasis altered).
125. [d. at 406.
126. [d. at 427.
127. [d.
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... [We must secure] equal rights [and] the declared in~
tention of the Constitution of your fathers. . .. [W]hen all are
free, a minority of the citizens of a State may [not] disenfran-
chise a majority of the citizens of full age....
. .'. There is a further guarantee in the Constitution, of a
republican form of government to every State, which I take to
mean'the majority of the free male citizens in every State shall
have the political power.128 '
Bingham also observed that in South CarolIna and Mississippi, (free)
blacks outnumbered whites. 129
Later in the session, Ralph Buckland noted in passing that con-
trol of government by a "mere fraction of the people" is' "contrary to
the fundamental priq,ciples of republican government";130 and in an
extremely important spe~ch on behalf of the Select Committee on
Reconstruction in which he explained the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment to his colleagues, Senator Jacob Howard provided more
elaboration. He began by quoting Madison on ,the "essence of repub-
lican government"--not the Madison ,of Number 10, distinguishing
between republics and pure democracies, but the Madison of Number
39, who, in the text Howard quoted, had insisted that in a Republic
the "mass of citizens" must have a "voice, in making the laws."131
What about women? asked his challengers. By natural law, retorted
Howard, "women and children were not regarded as the equals of
men... , [M]ature Il1~mhood is the representative type of the human
race."132 Still later in this session, the radical George Boutwell
challenged Tennessee's readmission to Congress by invoking the Re-
publican Government, Clause. He denied that republican govern-
ment demanded that "every man should vote" but claimed that "the
great majority" must be enfranchised~133 Yet moments later, he ap-
128. ld. at 430-31.
129. ld. at 431.
130. ld. at 1627.
131. ld. at 2767.
132. ld. For a similar denominatorial exchange over black suffrage, women's suf·
frage, and the meaning of Republican Government, see CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d
Sess. 557·58 (1869) (Remarks of Representatives Boutwell, Niblack, and Eldridge).
133. CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3976 (1866).
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peared to slip into a more sweeping claim that all racial exclusions in
suffrage were un-Republican.134
Several months later, John Broomall asked how the government
of South Carolina can:
be considered republican in form when four out of every seven
adult males are denied the right of suffrage ....
. If it be said that this argument applies with equal force to
my own State, I admit it, and with some sense of humiliation.
Possibly, as but one in sixty is there excluded from participa-
tion in the government, the maxim de minimus non curat lex
might reconcile easy consciences.135 . . . .
And what about women? "I am ready to advocate this extension
[of suffrage] whenever the women of America shall believe them-
selves unfairly treated" by virtual representation via men.136
Similar t~emes'would resound through later Congresses. In the
40th Congress, for ex~ple, we find Senator Richard Yates defining
"republican government" as one in which no "portion[ ] of the people"
are disenfranchised on racial grounds;137 and claims that Republi-
can Government means "that the majority ought to rule, subject to
the equal right of the minority to the same rights with themselves,
without regard t~ color"138 --i.e., equal protection for the minority.
Once again, John Bingham of Ohio provided the most careful
analysis, in a speec~, on the admission of Kansas's twin sister, Ne-
braska. Here is how he summed up a century-old tradition of Ameri-
can discourse on Republican Government: .
Now sir, what is a republican form of government? If there
is anything settled under, the American Constitution by the
traditions of our people and by the express laws'ofthis land, it
is the absolute, unquestioned, unchallenged right of a majority
ofAmerican male citizens, of full age, resident within an organ-
ized constitutional State of this Union, to control its entire po-
litical power ... in the mode prescribed by the Constitution of
-the United States ....
134. [d.
135. CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (1867).
136. [d.
137. CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 351 app. (1868).
138. CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 543 (1867) (remarks ofJohn Bingham).
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The right of the majority of the male citizens of the United
States of full age to control its political powers is of the essence
of the rights . . . reaffirmed by that ... provision of the Con-
stitution of the United States which declares "that the United
States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican
form of government."139
V. CONCLUSION
Amidst all the quotes, we must not lose sight of the main point.
Republican Government did have a central meaning at the Founding
and for a century thereafter. Many current theories of Republican
Government sidestep this central meaning; and one theory--a strong
form of the Anti-Direct Democracy Thesis--comes close, at least rhet-
orically, to betraying the central meaning. The central meaning of
Republican Government revolved tightly around popular sover-
eignty, majority rule, and the people's right to alter or abolish. Until
, .
we see this central meaning, we will miss much of the essence of
American Constitutions--state and federal--and much of our history
as a People.
139. CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (1867) (paragraphs inverted).
